

SECRET

P  
Y

69

4 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : IG Report on Active Duty for Training of Reservists  
[redacted]

1. I have considered [redacted] report in detail and it seems to me that several basic mistakes were committed in the approach to evaluating the so-called [redacted] training. First, the subject appears to have been treated in a vacuum without relating it to the content of the general course of instruction designed for and offered to the several reserve units at their weekly meetings over the course of the year; second, it was viewed in light of the theoretical ultimate in mobilization planning (each reservist identified with a particular wartime billet) instead of the hard facts as to the present amorphous state of mobilization planning.

2. Turning to my first point above, some four years ago when I became commanding officer of the Army reserve unit I had developed, in consultation with the commanding officers of the other Agency reserve units, a three year cyclical training program designed to provide our reservists with at least basic, essential information on world-wide US military alliances and commitments; strengths, weaknesses and capabilities of US military forces; missions and capabilities of our NATO allies; organization, strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite military organization and intelligence and counter-intelligence services and finally, CIA's wartime role with the emphasis on the tasks Agency reservists would carry out in providing direct support to the military in the field of unconventional warfare. These courses, when viewed as integral parts of a comprehensive training program, should afford the reservist an understanding of some of the types of active situations the US may be likely to become involved in, what we may have by way of support and what we could face in terms of opposition. To this background we then add one of the most important aspects of the program, namely a basic acquaintance with the varied roles to be played by our individual reservists.

3. In order to properly interpret and explain these possible missions which may befall CIA reservists we rather painstakingly cover during the training year the so-called UW functions, i.e. [redacted] E & E, guerilla warfare, etc. Formal lesson plans, each

SECRET

SECRET

O  
P  
Y

one concentrating on a particular aspect of UW activities, are prepared and issued to each reservist to study and discuss at the weekly meetings. In several instances, actual paper exercises are run through during the class sessions to try to bring home to the student the type of problem which a military commander in the field might well turn over to him and expect him to handle. In other words, within the limits of time and availability of facilities we do everything possible to get the man ready to perform in one of the many support roles which this Agency has committed itself to the military to supply. It seems to me that the culmination of this training is the actual, physical participation by the reservist in the [ ] courses. These courses are not, in my opinion, isolated instruments of training to be used by reservists when they can find nothing better to do but rather they are valuable tools to be used by each member of the group in rounding out his mobilization preparation and I expect, over the long run, to hope each man expose himself to each course offered.

4. Now as to the second point I mentioned in my opening statement I think we have got to take a realistic approach to this problem of mobilization planning and specific assignments of personnel to mobilization billets. TO and E units, National Guard outfits and similar reserve components are trained as self-contained units and often enter active service as such. At least the assumption in training them as units is that they will remain intact. In such an organization each man can be and is earmarked and trained to perform a specific job and can realistically be given a specific mobilization designation. The problem confronting the Agency is a much more complicated one and, without going into a discussion of our war planning problems, it seems to me that the emergency will be imminent before we reach the point where we can place any sizeable number of reserves in specific assignments with any reasonable hope that they will actually perform in same when the emergency strikes. There is no tangible benefit achieved by a paper slotting of individuals against proposed mobilization positions if we are not relatively sure of the validity of such assignments. This mistake could be seriously compounded if such a paper exercise were used as a basis for determining the reserve training requirements of each individual and we then set about tailoring a narrow, specialized program for him only to find later that he will be used in some completely different activity.

5. In essence, I feel that we must maintain a fairly broad gauge program providing each reservist with diversified training in as many aspects of UW as our capabilities permit so that we will create a pool of at least semi-trained people who can be called upon for a variety of assignments should the need arise. The

SECRET

C  
O  
P  
Y

25X1A [ ] courses add considerably to the impact of such a program and are an integral part of it.

6. Relating my remarks to your recommendations I would offer the following opinions:

- a. Specific mobilization assignments for individual reservists are neither essential nor even desirable at this time and, therefore, a problem for Career Council consideration does not exist.
- b. The four commanders of the Agency reserve units should consider, once again, the relationship of active duty for training to the year long training program developed by them, giving special attention to the possibility of making training [ ] mandatory for all active members over a prescribed period of time (5-6 years).
- c. The principle of a diversified flexible training program designed to provide reservists a background in military, intelligence and operational subjects in order to maintain a trained cadre of personnel susceptible of assignment to a variety of Agency commitments be accepted as sound and, therefore, detailed planning for individuals not be implemented.

25X1A

ROBERT AMORY, JR.  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

ODDI/EHH/vcl  
Distribution:  
O&I-addressee  
2-DDI  
1-EHH